Network Effects in the Microsoft Case by Timothy F Bresnahan





Preliminary and Incomplete Version, 





The internal Microsoft documents made public in the antitrust trial have a great 
deal of information about how the firm views industry equilibrium, enough to attribute to 
the firm a clear theory.  Not distant or abstract but an immediate and pragmatic guide to 
decision making, the firm’s theory is nonetheless fully articulated and analytically stated.  
In this paper, I first examine the relationship between economic theories of network 
effects and Microsoft’s theory of the computer software and Internet industries.  Many of 
the positive elements of the more formal theory are quite clearly present in the internal 
analysis: positive feedback, lock-in, first mover advantages, installed base effects, high 
inertia in established networks but low inertia in new ones, indeterminacy of equilibrium, 
and the importance of strategic choices about compatibility and incompatibility.     
Interestingly, however, Microsoft also has several lines of analysis which have not been 
central in the literature; many of these have to do with three linked areas the literature has 
largely neglected,  (a) management of network effects systems and (b) the mechanisms 
by which lock-in ends, and (c) multiple partial overlapping clusters of network effects.   
Some of the ways in which they analyze familiar theoretical ideas suggest that we have 
not yet understood the way theory will matter in the market place; practice may have 
outrun theory here.  I second examine the relationship between network effects theory 
and the Microsoft lawsuit, an undertaking full of surprises.  
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1) Introduction: Microsoft’s Internal View of N/W Effects 
Network effects, positive feedback, lock in, and related concepts have been an 
important part of industrial organization theory in recent years.
1  They are also 
phenomena, a part of technical and managerial life in the industries, such as computers, 
software, computer networks, the Internet-based industries, and telecommunications, 
where external economies are first-order drivers of market outcomes.  The unique 
perspective offered by the Microsoft internal documents brought to light in the antitrust 
case gives us an opportunity to examine the relationship between the theory and the 
marketplace.   Microsoft is a very analytical firm, and thinks of itself as involved in 
complex strategic games involving many outside agents.  Accordingly, many of the 
documents take as their focus the industry, not the firm, and many of them are quite 
explicitly theoretical (if not in a formal, abstract way.)  While the documents of a single 
firm can only be limitedly useful in addressing welfare economics questions, they have a 
good deal of material that helps address the positive question of the correspondence 
between the theory and reality – where reality means, operationally, the Microsoft-eye-
view of reality.
2 
Microsoft’s views of network effects and lock in can be most clearly seen in these 
documents with regard to the browser and to operating systems, for the largest number of 
documents bear on those two.
3  Looking at both of those also affords us the opportunity 
to examine Microsoft’s theory from two very distinct perspectives.  Microsoft is the 
beneficiary of a positive feedback loop that reinforces the position of its Windows 
operating system.  The positive feedback loop in browsers, however, went to Netscape, 
and Microsoft found itself on the outside looking in.
4 Any softheadedness about how 
equilibrium works is likely to disappear when we examine this perspective.  Accordingly, 
I shall spend most of my time on these two loci of network effects, and only briefly visit 
some others, such as the Office applications suite and the Java divided applications 
development framework.    
In what follows, the main positive feedback loops will have the following 
common elements.  The loop will flow back and forth between two groups of 
nonstrategic actors, “developers” and “users.”  Developers – of applications programs for 
operating systems, of content for web sites, of programs that run on web sites, etc. -- will 
                                                 
1  Surveyed in David and Greenstein (1990), Katz and Shapiro (1994), and Economides (1999), 
among other places. 
2  I shall look almost exclusively at Microsoft documents, though the trial brought other firms’ 
documents to light as well, in smaller volume.  I shall examine other firms’ thinking primarily when 
looking at aspects of the theory that turn on asymmetric information.  My methods point about welfare 
economics is that it is hard to filter the self-serving out of any firm’s documents.   
3 While Microsoft’s attorneys would argue that there is no such thing as a browser, and that 
Microsoft’s “internet browsing technologies” were merely part of its operating system, no one inside the 
company ever thought such a silly thing, and the documents contain two rich and separate veins of material 
about network effects in browsers and in operating systems. I shall endeavor to keep my partisan remarks 
in footnotes like this one until we reach section 5). 
4 At every stage, Microsoft was convinced that it would lose the browser war if all it did was make 
a better browser, price it cheaper, and market it heavily.  Only after a long campaign of anticompetitive acts 
did it succeed in thwarting the browser threat.  This is the first example of the promise I made in fn. 3. Page 3  Bresnahan  Preliminary Version 
want to spread fixed cost of development over a large volume of use.  Users value the 
number, variety, or quality of developers’ output.  In between the users and developers 
lies an interface standard layer which may be entirely proprietary (Windows), open 
(HTML for browsers) or partially (or temporarily) open and partially proprietary (HTML 
and extensions)
5.  The interface standard layer permits developers to interact with it 
through an Applications Programming Interface (“API”) and connects to users through a 
User Interface (“UI”)
6.   
Any layer that has both wide usage and an API is called a “platform,” in 
Microsoft parlance.  Accordingly, there is a Windows platform, a Browser platform, a 
Lotus Notes Platform, a Java platform, etc.  The positive feedback loop arises because 
developers choose a standard not only for its native technological qualities as a 
development environment, but also for the extent to which it is used, while users choose 
products that embody the standard not only for their standalone qualities but also for the 
degree to which developers enhance it.  In the typical nomenclature of the economic 
theory of network effects, these are “indirect” network effects.
7   Since users and 
developers sink platform-specific investments, the network effects are dynamic, offering 
a role for expectations, for strategy, and for inertia.  When strategic actors sponsor 
platform-defining technologies, this situation leads to a very rich set of theoretical issues, 
especially when multiple strategic actors contend for the same platform-leading position. 
The next sections ((2) and 3) )are a very happy time for economic theory.  Most 
of the main elements of the theory are present.  External economies leading to multiple 
possible equilibria in the long run are a core concept in Microsoft’s thinking – the 
browser war could have tipped to either Netscape standards or Microsoft ones.  At early 
stages, the path to a long run equilibrium is open to strategic influence.  But at late stages, 
positive feedback plus the tendency of many nonstrategic agents, developers and users 
both, to have made sunk investments specific to a particular platform make it very hard to 
change.  Compatibility over time is extremely important, as a result.  Along the path to a 
selecting a long run equilibrium, coordination is a complex activity involving 
expectations, volumes of communication among the to-be-coordinated actors, and the 
bargaining and other problems that come with coordination games under imperfect 
information.  All of these elements are remarkably clear in the documents. 
The theory falls short of fully capturing Microsoft’s view of the issues on some 
trivial dimensions and two very important ones, as we shall see in section 4).  Trivially, 
life is far more complex than abstract theory, and in the world there is a great deal of 
managing and coordinating wrapped around the abstractions of equilibrium.  More 
profoundly, Microsoft, as the proprietor of a locked-in de facto standard, Windows, is 
intensely interested in the circumstances by which lock in can end.  This is a part of the 
                                                 
5  I use “open” here to mean “open on both sides of the interface,” which is not universal usage: 
Microsoft calls the Windows PC “open” because anyone can make a computer that runs Windows or an 
application that runs on Windows, though only they can make Windows. 
6  Sometimes the user interface is labeled as a GUI, a shell, or a client. Not all platforms include a 
UI; some use the UI of other products.   
7  In contrast to “direct” network effects where users directly value other users (e.g., in telephony, 
I value you being connected to the phone network if I want to call you.)  See Katz and Shapiro (1994) and 
Liebowitz and Margolis.  There are probably also some “direct” network effects in platform software (I ask 
you to help me figure out what is wrong with my computer . . .) and there is certainly some individual user 
and individual developer sunk costs that make switching platforms costly. Page 4  Bresnahan  Preliminary Version 
theory that has not gotten very much attention at all, and an important one for the world.  
Much of Microsoft’s thinking on this, and the computer industry’s generally, has to do 
with vertical disintegration.  The mechanism by which a firm controlling a lock in 
situation can lose that control have largely to do with the behavior of vertically 
disintegrated complements.  That reveals another (positive) shortcoming of existing 
theory, its focus on situations in which there is only a single “platform layer” (usually 
called “hardware” in the theory.)  One of the very important elements of the computer 
business is the presence or absence of separate, partially overlapping loci of positive 
feedback and lock in.  These two gaps may or may not offer interesting avenues for the 
theory to develop, but they are first-order phenomena not captured by existing theory. 
Finally, I examine the relationship between the theory and the antitrust case, as 
opposed to the theory and the industry.  While the theory has a lot to say about the 
industry, it did not play a central role in the case, and did not at all play the role usually 
attributed to it.   
2) Browser Positive Feedback Loops 
Microsoft came late to the Internet, and found that Netscape Navigator and open 
Internet connectivity protocols like HTML were quickly being established as de facto 
standards.  Individual users liked the Navigator browser, individual user switching costs 
were high, and Navigator had by far the highest share in browser usage. A large number 
of web sites were designed to be used with Navigator or with the open standards 
Navigator supported, and, as Navigator’s and the web sites’ technological complexities 
increased, the extent of this dependency was increasing.   The likely market outcome, as 
seen from Microsoft’s perspective, was tipping to a Netscape-centric (or open, non-
Microsoft-centric) standard in browsers.  This would result in vertical disintegration and 
divided technical leadership, with operating system interface standards controlled by 
Microsoft and PC to Internet connection standards either controlled by another firm 
(Netscape, most likely) or set in an open way. Since this outcome was competitively and 
strategically undesirable to Microsoft
8, the firm set out to ensure that Internet connection 
standards would come under its own proprietary control.  The main vehicle for this would 
be Microsoft’s own browser, Internet Explorer (“IE”).   The struggle between a 
Navigator-based standard and an IE-based one would come to be known as the “browser 
war,” beginning in the spring of 1995, when Microsoft realized the importance of the 
Internet, and continuing until Netscape’s collapse in 1998.  
It is unlikely that one will ever find a more perfect correspondence between 
theory and fact than in Figure 1 with its nice positive feedback graphic.
9    This is a slide 
                                                 
8 Microsoft viewed these developments as good for its customers and bad for it.  See extensive 
quotes in Bresnahan (2001).  Paul Maritz, third in command at Microsoft summarized the problem from the 
perspective of standards setting by asking, “which is worse, an open [standard] or one controlled by 
someone else?” cite xxx. 
9 The entire document containing Figure 1, like all the documents referenced in this paper, may be 
found on the web.  This one is Government Exhibit 488 from the trial and can be found at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/488.pdf   In what follows I shall use the notation “GX 488” as a 
shorthand.   
GX 488 is a 137 page presentation reviewing marketing plans for Internet Explorer 3, 
Webmasters, and ActiveX , and Figure 1, which is the seventh page, is the backbone theory slide for the 
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from a browser and Internet marketing plan presentation.  The problem for Microsoft in 
this area, as the speaker has just shown, is Netscape’s “Market share, defacto standard.”   
That is, the speaker bases his analysis on a “platform API battle” which Microsoft was at 
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The positive feedback loop that the speaker would like to get going passes 
through end user demand for IE, and through websites that might be based on Microsoft 
technologies (IE/ActiveX/ActiveX controls).
10  It also passes through “influentials” – 
people who influence the technology decisions of others.   Note that the speaker’s 
conclusions closely follow the core logic of an indirect network effects theory.  To win 
the platform API battle, market “share is key.”  To get that share, one needs “critical 
mass and momentum” with end users, where “broad distribution” will lead to supply by 
developers and by builders of web sites.  One also needs “critical mass and momentum” 
on the developer / web site side.  Getting “critical mass and momentum” leads to the 
positive feedback cycle graphically shown.   
The strategic problem being addressed here is that same positive feedback is 
already occurring in non-Microsoft technologies.  That cycle might be labeled:  End User 
Demand => Netscape Sites => Java => Influentials => End User Demand.  Developers 
making websites and applications that run on them were focused on Java and Navigator 
standards and APIs, and end users were using Navigator.  The presenter is writing at a 
time when Microsoft is very far behind in browser market share and the resulting positive 
feedback cycle is beginning to move toward a non-Microsoft equilibrium.  It has not yet 
gotten there, however, so there is still an opportunity to steer the positive feedback cycle 
toward Microsoft technologies rather than outside ones.  Whatever you call that – 
indeterminacy of equilibrium and “tipping” are the main two labels in the theoretical 
literature – it is a centerpiece of Microsoft’s thinking. 
Of course, the world is more complex than any theory – the “influentials” who 
play a large role in Microsoft’s practical plan don’t arise in the theoretical literature – but 
this does not mean that the theory is not highly useful.  Indeed, Microsoft used the basic 
insights of the theory as an analytical backbone while connecting them to the world in 
direct, pragmatic, operational ways. 
At all levels, Microsoft thought about the problem as one of breaking the positive 
feedback cycle working for Netscape.  In a June, 1996 email to a senior group of 
executives in Windows and Internet areas, Paul Maritz, number three in the company, 
wrote about “key issues related to Internet & Windows businesses that we have to 
address” (GX 42)
11.  At several junctures, he worries about the “reinforcement cycle” as 




                                                 
10 “ActiveX Controls” were (at this time) small computer programs that can run inside (among 
other larger programs) a browser.  They permit website developers to add such features as displaying 
complex documents (multimedia, databases) in the user’s browser.  More generally, ActiveX is a Microsoft 
brand name variously applied to technologies developers use for media, web, etc. 
11 See footnote 9 to see how to find the whole document on the web.  Page 7  Bresnahan  Preliminary Version 
In his detailed analysis, Mr. Maritz is very worried that web site “collaboration 
and community features” such as “publish pages” “host threaded discussions” “view 
collections of messages” “have a look at what others have said about this page, etc.” will 
become very popular, take root and become an interface standard under the control of 
Netscape.  As a result he writes in the same document of the need to slow Netscape 
down:  
Figure 3 
Mr. Maritz had formed this view quite early.  In an April 1995 document entitled 
“Netscape as Netware” (we shall return to that evocative (to a computer nerd) analogy 
below) (GX 498) he worries about a “feedback loop [that] drives Netscape market share 
higher (as content providers encourage its use) to the point where Netscape can go 
‘proprietary’)” and thinks that this would be the bridge to future competition against 
Microsoft.  He thus argues “We should not allow any one Web client to get to high 
volume.  This means (i) not letting a vacuum open up, and (ii) ensuring that we get broad 
distribution for our Web client.”  
All of Microsoft’s senior management team agreed about the problem of tipping 
to a Netscape standard.  James Allchin, in (GX 489), "Navigator/NetOne provides a new 
API set -- in near/medium term, Navigator provides the volume platform for ISVs & 
Corps to target."
12 
Bill Gates, having spent the better part of a week thinking about Microsoft / 
Netscape competition, sent a six page memo about that “impressive competitor” in April 
’96 (GX 41).   He finishes with the problem of finding some “Gravity” for Netscape since  
”Given the positive spiral that Netscape is experiencing what could possibly slow them 
down?”  (p. 6.)  Mr. Gates is, of course, no stranger to positive feedback or to the 
indeterminacy of equilibrium, having written eloquently about them in connection with 
the standard defining the IBM PC (and Microsoft’s operating system).
13 
Why are they sure that the tipping is going against them?  Having done some 
market research, the speaker in Figure 1 does a systematic review of available 
measurements.
14  He reports that browser market share is much higher for Netscape than 
Microsoft
15, that vastly more web sites link to Navigator than to IE (mostly suggesting a 
download) that the developers of web sites are a new audience and “MS’ influence over 
this audience is weak” as 74% optimize their site for Navigator, only 7% for IE.  Thus the 
positive feedback loop is going for open standards / Netscape standards, not Microsoft 
ones.
16  
Brad Chase, in a long 1996 presentation called “How to get to 30% [Browser] 
Share in 12 Months,” (GX 684) suggests a number of practical steps to move the network 
                                                 
12  He refers to the two important classes of applications developers, Independent Software 
Vendors and Corporations (for use by employees).  
13 See Gates (1995).   
14 A late slide reviews all the available metrics and data sources.  
15  Again, see footnote 9 to see how to access this specific document on the web.  
16 One plus for his side is that many more developers already write for Microsoft APIs; 
unfortunately, however, not Web ones (cf. “Retention” in Figure 1) so they need a way to migrate 
applications developers to Microsoft web technologies before they migrate to open or Netscape ones.  We 
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effects from open/Netscape technologies to Microsoft ones.   He sketches out the key 
elements of the positive feedback loop.
 17  For example, he takes the perspective of 
“Publishers and Content Developers” and notes that the advantage to Netscape comes 
because “We [Netscape] will continue to be the share leader / 80% of users run 
Navigator” while from the perspective of “Consumers / Home Users” “All interesting 
sites support Netscape” which is “The Internet Standard Browser.”  For both audiences, 
an advantage of Navigator is that it is “cross platform,” that is, runs on any kind of 
computer. To move the positive feedback loop, Chase suggests radical action.  On the 
user side, this includes, famously and chillingly, “The Internet is part of Windows.  We 
will bind the shell to the Internet Explorer, so that running any other browser is a jolting 




More generally, Chase in GX 465 offers the basic layout of Microsoft’s overall 
view of how to win platform battles.  
 
Figure 5 
There are three reasons I ask you to look at Figure 5 (all three points appear in a 
large number of documents.) The first thing to note is the basic strategic structure.  To 
win a platform battle, one attempts to move all the different external agents in the 
direction of one’s own standards.  Some classes of external agents to be moved are 
viewed as fundamentally nonstrategic, such as end users or developers.  This corresponds 
to the typical assumption in the theory that such agents are atomistic and followers, while 
the platform sponsors behave strategically.  Other classes of external agents are here 
viewed as strategic actors, an issue to which we shall return.  Second, note that there are a 
large number of management tools to influence external agents – coordination in the 
world is achieved at least in considerable part by management.  Third, note that Mr. 
                                                 
17 Chase brings more kinds of economic actors into the positive feedback loop, such as 
corporations developing intranets (where the same buyer is both user and developer) and independent 
software vendors (whom he distinguishes from content providers.) 
18  The unfamiliar acronyms here: “IAP” is “Internet Access Provider” and “MDA” is “Market 
Development Agreements” – the discounts to computer manufacturers (OEMs) used to reward those who 
pushed IE rather than Netscape.  Page 9  Bresnahan  Preliminary Version 
Chase’ argument is fundamentally inductive, and that he uses the past as example for the 
future.  This is an important theme in Microsoft’s thinking.  Microsoft shows no sign of 
having been influenced by the academic development of the theory.  Clearly, they 
worked it out for themselves
19 (Mr. Gates has a strong role as chief theorist.)  Thus 
correspondences between Microsoft’s theory of how the industry work and economists’ 
provide a testing ground for they positive predictive value of our theory.  
a) Timing Issues  
One of the fundamental issues in the literature is about the possibility of 
influencing network effects at different stages of their development.  One core idea is that 
it is easier to influence the direction of a positive feedback loop, at least one where there 
are coordination costs or individual-follower sunk costs, at some stages more than at 
others.  Given the importance of timing and the importance of network effects in 
Microsoft’s core businesses, it is no surprise that they have an elaborate doctrine of this.  
Mr. Gates, in his (1995) book, gets quickly to the most important strategic conclusion, 
which he writes largely about the IBM PC: equilbrium was indeterminate at an early 
stage, but IBM got there and set the standard, later equilibrium was far harder to change, 
timing was very important.  Some of the internal documents expand on this theme in an 
interesting way. 
In a meditative exchange between Mr. Myrhvold and Mr. Gates about the Internet 
in 1994 (meditative because they had not yet realized that the ‘net was a competitive 
issue for Windows, they were analizing it in relationship to Microsoft’s online service, 
MSN) Nathan Myhrvold in DX 386 wrote: 
 
Figure 6 
The “you” is Mr. Gates.  Note that Mr. Myrvold thinks that it is easy to establish 
“protocols and programs” early – because they are “expanding into a vacuum.”  Later it 
gets much harder and more inertial “more like the PC market -- standards change 
slowly.”  Note that the key change, in Mr. Myrvold’s view, comes when the nature of the 
nonstragic follower’s use of a standard changes from the “ephemeral and quickly 
                                                 
19  Indeed, many of the elements of positive feedback, network effects, and lock in had been clear 
to IBM not long after that firm invented the computer platform in 1964.  See Bresnahan and Greenstein 
(1999).  PC industry participants generally, and Mr. Gates in particular, understand these analytical lines in 
a deeper and more strategic way than did IBM, however. Page 10  Bresnahan  Preliminary Version 
replaced” to something more complex and involving more commitment “buy in” from 
them. 
Figure 7 
Microsoft does, not, by the way, make these analyses for their intellectual interest.  
One reason is to rally the troops; another reason is to allocate resources within the firm, 
yet another reason is to make difficult product and alliance decisions.  Consider these 
summaries by Brad Silverberg, leader of the Internet Platforms and Tools Division at an 
April, 1996 Division Meeting (GX 40) as “They are smart, aggressive, and have a big 
lead.  This is not Novell or IBM we are competing with.”  Later “The world has 
changed” in that “Customers have alternatives: we are behind.” (Emphases in original.)  
Brad Chase (April 1996 planning memo) notes "Netscape is already entrenched in our 
markets all over the world.  The situation today is scary."  GX 39  Why be scared? Brad 
Chase FY98 Planning Memo “Preserving the Desktop Paradise” 4/97 clearly thought that 
the browser war was going to end with lock in to one standard or the other.  
 
Figure 8 
There are really interesting actionable implications of the theory, which lead to important 
decisions.  Mr. Gates, in GX 41 (cited above) conjectures that it may be easier to catch 
Netscape outside the United States, because the positive feedback cycle is less far 
along.
20  Mr. Chase (GX 465) operationalized. 
 
b) Expectations Important under Indeterminate Tipping 
One of the key elements of positive feedback theory is the possibility of multiple 
equilibria of the long run, static coordination game and the resulting role for dynamics in 
selecting the equilibrium.  While the literature has largely emphasized the welfare 
economics of “path dependence,” there is an important positive implication here as well, 
concerning the formation of expectations before the system has fully tipped to any of the 
possible LR equilibria.
21  This has an immediate and practical role in Microsoft’s theory 
of managing positive feedback and tipping. 
We looked at GX 684, Brad Chase’ “How to get to 30% [Browser] Share in 12 
Months,” above.  Chase clearly thinks that expectations are important – and can be 
managed – , as you can see from what he puts first in his proposal on dealing with 
“publishers and content providers” in Figure 9, where he contrasts Netscape and 
Microsoft marketing messages to that audience.   
                                                 
20 This interesting remark leads to a standing effort to “out-localize” Navigator and some 
frustration on Microsoft’s part when Netscape turns out to be good at non-English version.   
21  See Dranove et al (1999) for an econometric examination of expectations and “vaporware.” Page 11  Bresnahan  Preliminary Version 
 
Figure 9 
Microsoft did send out this message
22, and it was picked up in the broader 
marketplace.  After having been briefed about a Microsoft presentation at an influential 
Silicon Valley venture capitalist’s offices, Mike Homer of Netscape wrote in an email: 
“M/S thinks that with a client competitive with Netscape’s (doesn’t even 
have to be better or equal, just comparable) and IE bundled into every 
Win95 desktop from Q4 1996 on, it ultimately wins the client war (that’s 
3-4MM more browser seats every month!).  . . . And by winning the client 
war, M/S secures dominance for ActiveX and marginalizes Java.  That is 
the Microsoft endgame for the Internet client market as far as I can tell.” 
Kumar Mehta of Microsoft thought the message had been received in corporations and by 
webmasters by March 1997 (in GX 205) “from all our research with IS [corporate 
Information Systems] and web professionals we know that they eventually expect us to 
win the browser war because Ie [sic] will be bundled with the operating system and they 
will have no real reason to purchase navigator.”   
All of that discussion is about efforts to influence expectations of small, strategic 
follower actors.  One could go into some depth about the technology of managing that 
influence, and especially the importance of expectations and ideas in that management. In 
particular, the phrase “developer mindshare,” which refers to developers thinking about 
which platforms might be suitable for their applications recurs steadily, into Microsoft’s 
developer tools businesses, or into the verb “evangelize,” which refers to platform 
sponsors’ efforts to inform and convince developers about their standards and 
technology.  (Microsoft spends a good deal of time measuring developer mindshare and 
has literally thousands of employees working in developer relations.)  I think, however, 
that for present purposes this is simply another juncture at which the theory corresponds 
to the world complexly but directly.  
Let us therefore turn to external agents whom it is not appropriate to view as 
passive and nonstrategic.  Here is a far more interesting quote from an email inside AOL 
(GX 38) at the time, January 1996, when Microsoft was at the height of its campaign to 
convince the industry that, despite appearances, the equilibrium would later tip from 
Netscape to Microsoft.  Microsoft encouraged the strategically important AOL to believe 
this story, but the two firms were in the middle of negotiations of how much Microsoft 
was going to pay AOL to help in the effort to tip.
23  Note that the author (David Cole of 
AOL) believes that tipping means the end of Netscape, a correct forecast.  
                                                 
22 The message inherits the unlawful nature of the bundle itself, but that is not an important point 
at this juncture.  
23 The email is interesting for the light it throws on that effort, as Mr. Gates is reported to have 
delivered “a characteristically blunt query. How much do we need to pay you to screw Netscape??  (‘this is Page 12  Bresnahan  Preliminary Version 
 
. . . 
 
Figure 10 
I find these remarks particularly interesting for what they tell us about the 
economics of negotiation to tip – that is, to coordinate toward a LR equilibrium -- among 
strategic players who are incompletely informed.  First off, AOL, a strategic player, is 
being quite careful to make its own assessment of the likelihood of tipping, rather than 
listening only to Microsoft’s or Netscape’s.  Paragraph 5) (of Figure 10) clearly argues 
that Microsoft’s theory is belied by their actions – the very fact that they are negotiating 
suggests that they need AOL!  Second, the strategic third party, AOL, is playing the two 
potential standard setters off against one another, and their analysis of the other firms’ 
incentives, circumstances, and truthfulness is highly sophisticated.
24  Third, they believe 
that delay and expectations in negotiations interact, in a way familiar from the theory of 
strikes (para 9 (of Figure 10)).  Fourth, and perhaps most interesting, they think that there 
is a complex interaction between the actions of strategic players and others’ beliefs in the 
coordination game among all players.  Look at para 5) (of Figure 10):  “A decision to 
shift from Netscape” later, after supporting Netscape, is better for Microsoft than “a pre-
emptive strike today”, even though a later shift is worse in terms of direct impact on 
shares (“deployment issues aside”) because of what the later shift signals.   
Reading documents like this should lead positive economists to exhibit more 
fondness for information-theoretic approaches to coordination and bargaining.
25  
                                                                                                                                                 
your lucky day.’).”  Gates ultimately paid through the nose, putting an AOL icon on the Windows desktop, 
which at this stage of the negotiation he said was “sacrosanct” (p. 2).  
In paragraph 5) “their” is “Microsoft’s” and in 9) “NS” is “Netscape.” 
24  Charles Ferguson, another interesting pragmatic theorist of network effects, writes interestingly 
of this in his 2000 book.   
25  Particularly those who like rational expectations equilibrium concepts.  Here is what Microsoft 
was thinking internally, which is not all that far from AOL’s guess: (Mr. Slivka in 1/96) GX xxxx 
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c) Lock in and Sources of Continuing Advantage 
Our theories tend to cleanly distinguish between individual user sunk costs and 
network effects and coordination problems as sources of lock in.  Industrialists don’t get 
to make assumptions, of course, so Microsoft and Netscape had to deal with the actual 
situation of the browser, which involved some of each of these elements.  This 
complexity is well illustrated by Microsoft’s later internal discussions about strategies to 
win the browser war, centering on their analysis of the impossibility of winning by 
making their own browser more attractive to consumers.  At these stages, the discussion 
often has less to do with the theory of the industry and more to do with the simple 
practicalities of attempting to build market share when far behind in a tipping race. 
Kumar Mehta, in a March 1997 email entitled “ie data” (GX 204) responding to 
the question about whether IE should be tied to what became Windows 98, summarizes 
“all the IE research we have done” (primarily consumer market research by survey.) He 
writes that “80% of those who do not use IE say that they have no plans to switch to it.  
which means that if we take away IE from the o/s most nav [Navigator] users will never 
switch to us.”   Clearly, Mehta is using a single-user switching cost model, at least in 
part, and sees a small installed base as a real strategic problem.
26 
Christian Wildfeuer, writing at about the same time about the results of focus 
groups of Microsoft’s most inframarginal end user customers, early adopters of Windows 
95, summarized the same issue in this way
27:  
 “Most of our IEUs [individual end users] were Navigator users.  They 
said they would not switch, would not want to download IE 4 to replace 
their Navigator browser. . .. .  To make them switch away from Netscape, 
we need to make them to [sic] upgrade to Memphis [Windows 98.] . . . We 
need to strengthen our key asset and our key brand which is Windows to 
win the internet war on the desktop side. . . . . convert the Navigator 
installed base and eclipse Netscape’s browser market share leadership.  
But if we rely on IE 4 alone to achieve this, we will fail.”  (emphasis in 
original) 
Around the same time, the more senior Mr. Allchin questions the possibility, even 
with a “totally competitive” browser offering, that IE would be chosen in the 
marketplace: 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
26 Jonathan Roberts agrees and uses the same theoretical frame in GX 205 “the only real chance IE 
has of getting them to switch is thru a new pc, an OS upgrade, or a new ISP kit.”   
27 By “IEUs” he means Individual End Users, by “Memphis” the OS version that became 
Windows 98, by “NT 5” the OS version that became Windows 2000, and by NC the Network Computer.   Page 14  Bresnahan  Preliminary Version 
 
Figure 11 
Note that Mr. Allchin uses a marketwide analysis, rather than a single-user 
switching cost model, when he draws the conclusion that IE must be tied to Windows to 
eclipse Navigator, working from a model in which an 80% market share product will 
persist in that position even against a better alternative.  
Mr. Chase, in GX 39, offers an interesting network effect theory linking 
individual user lock in and network effects.  He recognizes that new users will be easier 
to attract than existing, Netscape customers, but sees the existing base of Netscape users 
as “influentials” who cannot be ignored by Microsoft.
28  He reports that it has been hard 
to get users to switch from Netscape; most switchers have instead come from “second-
class” browsers.  His solution is not to make the browser itself better, but instead “the 
best way to make people switch browser is to make sure that they have to, in order to get 
the best content” – don’t move the chicken, move the egg.  
The general consensus inside Microsoft, late in the browser war, was that the 
entrenched position of Netscape could not be overcome. Bill Koszewski wrote in 




                                                 
28 He is not, I think, using “influentials in the same sense as Figure 1, but in a contagion-theory 
sense of adoption of technology. 
29 Similarly, a February 1998 “Business Outlook for Platforms-Desktop” presentation reports 
"Key customer feedback" on Internet Explorer: "Many customers see MS and NS as parity products; no 
strong reason to switch."  GX 428.   Page 15  Bresnahan  Preliminary Version 
At trial in 1999, Cameron Myrhvold, Vice President, Microsoft’s Internet 
Customer Unit, spoke to Microsoft’s reasoning with regard to contracting practices with 
Internet Service Providers: "we did specifically ask that ISPs distribute Internet Explorer 
by itself when they distributed Internet Explorer, so that we would not lose all of those 
side-by-side user choices." 
30  Mr. Roberts again (GX 355)  “Customer feedback … if 
they are de coupled, then Navigator has a good chance of winning.  In a browser battle, 
victory will go to the incumbent.”   
3) OS Positive Feedback loops 
The indirect network effects locking in the Windows de facto standard are long 
established and powerful.  Lock in to the OS monopoly is a fact of life in Microsoft 
business discussions.  Chris Jones, in GX 494, writes of the “traditional operating system 
competitors (Apple, OS/2, and UNIX)” that “there is simply no chance that we will lose 
sales because of lack of feature parity with those traditional products.”   Brad Chase, in 
his memo “Winning the Internet Platform Battle” of April, 1996 (GX 39) writes that 
Microsoft needs a “significant user installed base” to attract developers to either IE or 
Windows.  Without that: “The industry would simply ignore our standards.  Few would 
write Windows apps without the Windows user base.”  Mr. Jones again, in GX 523, 
writes that “We are so dominant in all other aspects of the market that we can never be 
displaced by a full frontal assault.”    Positive feedback is the essence of that.  Earlier, in 
1994, thinking about the last “full frontal assault” on Windows’ position, that of OS/2 
wrote (GX 465)
31 "large vendors like Corel, WordPerfect, and MicroGraphix have 
announced they are abandoning OS/2, it appears inevitable the OS/2 applications market 
is going to shrink more. . . . . So aside from a few native OS/2 applications, going 
forward the only applications available to OS/2 users will be today's MS-DOS and 16-bit 
Windows applications.  Since these apps most likely won't be updated once Windows 95 
launches, over time the experience of the OS/2 user will become akin to eating a steady 
diet of stale bread. . . . .there isn't a clear future for OS/2 users".   
Here is Mr. Maritz, in the 1997 Platform plan, writing about a threat to Windows 
at that time, the Network computer: 
                                                 
30  This is from the trial transcript of 2/10/99am, p. 62.  Trial transcripts may be found at several 
places on the Web, including Microsoft’s web site 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/trial/transcripts/default.asp.   




One important point of Figure 13 are that Mr. Maritz sees real limitations in his own 
product, Windows, from a customer perspective.  To emphasize this, he attributes to his 
customers a “real” desire to escape from the weaknesses of Windows, characterizing it as 
“End World Hunger.”   The external threat, the network computer, has two weaknesses, it 
is less functional and it has no “base” of applications, i.e., it is on the outside of the 
persistent network effects enjoyed by Windows.  It does not seem to me to be appropriate 
to conclude from Figure 13 alone that the NC is a more efficient technology that is locked 
out by the network effects – that would involve parsing the relative importance of the 
persistent network effects and the differences in functionality.
32  But the importance of 
the network effects means that the mechanism by which customers can influence 
Microsoft’s behavior, is voice, not exit.  They cannot realistically switch to an NC, but 
they can complain to Mr. Maritz.
33  Thus, as a result of the entry barrier resulting from 
the network effects, we do not have a market test of the propositions that the NC is 
superior or inferior.
34   
                                                 
32  In general, I think it has been a terrible mistake of the network effects literature to focus on 
such welfare counterfactuals.  They are too difficult to undertake reliably and convincingly. 
33  Microsoft indeed made efforts to reduce Windows “cost of ownership” through a number of 
initiatives.  
34  With this somewhat more muted welfare economics, I am far more comfortable.  It is also the 
welfare economics called for by antitrust law, as we shall see below. Page 17  Bresnahan  Preliminary Version 
It is worth understanding just a bit how the lack of applications for new 
competitors for the OS and the existing commitments of applications developers to 
Windows plays out.  Here is Mr. Chase on the subject in March 1998.  (Gx 828)   
“If we lose the developers, we will ultimately lose the platform.  Our goal 
is to build a community of developers and web professionals that 
emotionally and economically value Microsoft, our products, platform, 
and tools.  Competition is aware that ‘our’ developer community is a key 
MS asset and are working [to] divert developers from Windows.”  His 
“key metrics for this goal” include “>90% of developers targeting 
Windows” and “>80% of Java developers writing native Windows 
Applications.”   
In a sense, the key words here are “our” and “asset” – Mr. Chase clearly views the 
developer body as potentially mobile, but having considerable commitment to Windows.  
The platform-specific sunk costs of developers make them behave inertially and are a 
valuable strategic asset for Microsoft – that is a nice way, Mr. Chase, to link strategic 
entry deterrence theory and network effects theory 
a) Business People’s Inductive Methods 
Many Microsoft employees analogized the browser to the OS in thinking through 
how the new “platform battle” – the browser war -- would play out.  




Andrew Wright, writing in June 1996, made the following interesting positive 
feedback analogy.  Early Windows was not much of a product, but its “promise of a new 
way of computing and improved productivity generated momentum and ISV loyalty, 
which has transformed it into one of the most successful franchises in business history.”  
He looks at the then-WWW, and finds that the analogy is precise.  While not much of an 
applications environment at the time, it clearly had the capability of growing into one.  
Here is Mr. Chase in GX 512, using an induction to illuminate the issues.  
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Mr.Maritz (in GX 498) used a perhaps even more apropos historical analogy, for 
it caught not just the single-platform issues but also the idea of a separate cluster of 




Note the precision of Mr. Maritz’ argument: the problem with Netware was that it 
achieved “critical mass” at an interface (between client and server) and that as a result 
Microsoft will “have a really hard time displacing” them.  Mr. Gates in the Internet 
strategy day keynote picked up that same analogy of Netware, pointing out that the 
“market was overwhelmingly a Netware market” and pointing the way to how that might 
end, a topic to which we shall turn in a moment.  
 
What is interesting to me is how analytical these guys can be even though they use 
inductive methods.  Something for economists to learn here?  
4) Punctuated Equilibrium and Vertical Disintegration: 
Dynamical network effects theory has emphasized the transition from an early 
period of technological uncertainty to a period of in which choices are not reversed.  
Using the abstraction and focus that is one of economic theory’s strong points, much 
work writes as if the resulting structures are permanent and irreversible at the later stages, 
having been costlessly malleable at the early stages.  Sensible efforts to use the theory 
positively would, of course, view that implication in a slightly less stylized way, and take 
the implication to be that the system moves from a rather more malleable state to a less 
malleable one.
35  If the costs of moving a locked-in equilibrium are large but not infinite, 
                                                 
35  A remarkably small subset of users of the theory manages to make this elementary leap.  
Apparently serious scholars write that the theory is rejected whenever a coordinated change in the economy 
occurs. Fax machines are a common “carrier” for this argument for “direct” n/w externalities, and 
automobiles and gasoline stations for the “indirect” one.  The existence of these things, now, proves that 
the economy cannot ever have been in a situation where bringing them into existence would involve Page 19  Bresnahan  Preliminary Version 
then there will be a great deal of persistence, perhaps punctuated by periods of change 
when an innovation large enough to overcome the lock in arrives.
36  Microsoft, as we 
have just seen, clearly understood the persistence part; we now turn to their analysis of 
the mechanisms by which such persistence may end.  While an economic theory may or 
may not sensibly include “arrival of large innovations” within the scope of the 
endogenous objects, positive economics and pragmatic business people forming 
strategies need to think about such things.  Microsoft does, of course. There is clearly an 
extension to the theory (perhaps too obvious to write down? But as we shall see, quite 
rich) which is already in use in practice.
37 
In what follows, I shall go beyond received network effects theory in order to 
capture Microsoft’s thinking about these areas.  The unifying theme in all of this section 
is vertical disintegration.  Specifically, Microsoft’s thinking extends to the apparently 
general equilibrium case of two complementary products, each with its own partially 
separate, partially overlapping, indirect network effects.
38.  They,as the computer industry 
does in general, view the situation with more vertical disintegration of leadership as far 
more competitive than the situation with less.  This is how they saw, looking forward, 
Windows and the browser, or, looking back, Windows and Netware.  This larger model 
(for Microsoft uses it the way we use models) has four main roles that I have attempted to 
explicate below.  First, it explains the sources of disruptive change that might end lock in 
from a given cluster of network effects.  Second it explains why Microsoft thought that a 
vertically disintegrated structure was so undesirable.  If there are partially overlapping 
clusters of network effects, one might seek to “span” or “abstract” the other – that is, to 
reduce the importance of positive feedback and lock in to the other.  This same model, in 
some extremely sophisticated uses by Microsoft, also serves as a guide to strategic 
interaction with other players to make sure one's own technology embedding a set of 
network effects is not spanned and abstracted, and to guide spanning and abstracting 
assaults on others' platforms should they come into existence, (especially in their early 
period where the indirect network effects may be malleable.) 
The next four subsections take up these four linked ideas.   
a) Disruptive Change 
Any theory of the end to positive feedback cycles and breaking out of lock in 
needs to posit some kind of change that is important enough to break the cycle.  
Disruptive technical change is one obvious candidate, or cumulated technical change that 
                                                                                                                                                 
overcoming coordination problems.  The error, of course, comes from uncritically and literally looking at 
the theory’s stylized “permanent” and “infinitely costly” and not seeing the underlying “persistent” and 
“costly.”  Finite costs can be social costs, and delayed innovation can be a loss even if not delayed forever.  
36 See Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999) for an effort to explain the (low) frequency of platform 
shifts in computing along these lines.  
37  The circumstances ending lock in are a stepchild in the literature.  Shy (1999) has an analysis of 
a series of temporary lock ins, and Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999) has an inductive analysis of the 
process of ending lock in in computer platforms.  I know of no other treatments – perhaps this conference 
will enlighten me! 
38 Shane Greenstein and I (1999) called this "divided technical leadership" of a platform and noted 
its competition-enhancing structure.  I (1999) pointed out that the addition of new complementary layers 
can add new opportunities for divided technical leadership and thus to restart that kind of competition.  The 
Microsoft theory, like mine and Shane’s, has vertical disintegration of leadership positions as more 
competitive whether buttressed by indirect or direct (e.g., Wordperfect’s) network effects.  Page 20  Bresnahan  Preliminary Version 
crosses a sufficient threshold to be important enough to break the lock in.  Microsoft has 
thought about this a lot, and learned the first lesson of the “Arrow effect” for incumbent 
monopolists very well.  Microsoft seeks to anticipate and control disruptive change, 
knowing that the continuation of its position calls for it to control the technologies that 
might obsolete the platforms at the heart of its existing network effects.  Microsoft,  
accordingly, has a standing policy of participating, at least at a low level, in all of the 
technologies that might be the source of the disruption, so as to avoid unpleasant 
surprises.   
The Internet, however, grew up being used for things far from Microsoft’s main 
markets, and was genuinely irrelevant for at least its first twenty years.  The early stages 
of the commercialization of the Internet were not all that commercial, taking place in 
laboratories and universities.  Thus the Internet was able to build up considerable 
technical momentum, though it had no important connection to ordinary PC consumers.  
Several junior Microsoft employees saw the more end-user oriented trend in the Internet 
in 1994 as potentially relevant to the PC business, but despite a substantial meeting with 
Mr. Gates in Spring 1994, the company did not focus on the importance of this particular 
disruptive change until a year later.  What happened in the interim was that Netscape, a 
startup founded by the young inventor of the browser and some much more experienced 
technology business people, got a huge head start.  Navigator, introduced in late 1994, 
was an instant success, and well on the way to dominating the browser market (there 
were some existing freeware, etc., products) and in a clear position to “preempt”
39 
Microsoft’s browser before it even made it to the market.   
Many, many Microsoft internal documents talk about this disruptive surprise and 
how important it is to change one’s thinking to deal with it.  One interesting metaphor is 
the browser as a “Trojan horse” – it appears to be a nice application running on 
Windows, but there are surprises in it.  Another interesting metaphor is “change the 
rules.”
40 
Of all these documents, the most telling is a May 1995, memo from Mr. Gates 
(GX 20) entitled “The Internet Tidal Wave.”  Mr. Gates opens his memo by saying “Our 
vision for the last 20 years can be summarized in a succinct way.”  The vision is one of 
indirect network effects among users and developers of applications on a single PC.  That 
vision has now been obsoleted by events.  “The Internet is the most important single 
development to come along since the IBM PC was introduced in 1981” even more 
important than the graphical user interface.   
“The PC analogy is apt for many reasons.  The PC wasn’t perfect.  
Aspects of the PC were arbitrary or even poor.  However, a phenomena 
[sic] grew up about the IBM PC that made it a key element of everything 
that would happen for the next 15 years.  Companies that tried to fight the 
PC standard often had good reasons for doing so but they failed because 
the phenomena [sic] overcame any weaknesses that resisters identified.”   
While the Internet has been growing out in nerdy communities for a long time “Most 
important is that the Internet has bootstrapped itself as a place to publish content. . . . 
positive feedback loop . . .”  Then, at the very end, Mr. Gates writes “The Internet is a 
                                                 
39 In the words of Thomas Reardon, Microsoft employee who negotiated with Netscape. 
40 Mr. Muglia, August 1996: “’97 Tools Vision” “The Internet has changed the rules and opened 
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tidal wave.  It changes the rules.  It is an incredible opportunity as well as incredible 
challenge.”   
The essence of Mr. Gates’ analysis is disruptive change that comes from outside.  
Note, however, how sophisticated his argument is. First off, the disruptive change comes 
from a complement to PCs, not a substitute.  Second, ordinary technical change in 
computing and telecommunications is converted into disruptive change when it gets its 
own positive feedback cycle going.
41  The underlying theory, familiar in the economic 
literature underlying this paper in general but highly interesting in this application, is one 
in which positive feedback in new areas leads to very rapid complementary 
developments, just as in old areas it can lead to lock in.  The analogy to the success of the 
PC/Windows is used to direct Microsoft employees not to “resist” the “phenomena [sic]” 
of positive feedback around the Internet, even though they might have “good reasons” for 
that . . .in a metaphor that is striking as way to summarize the managerial implications of 
network effects, the company must align itself with the tidal wave and control it rather 
(opportunity) rather than resist it (challenge.)  
Microsoft thought that its monopoly in PC operating systems was unassailable 
from any direct assault.  The network effects associated with Windows as a platform 
were enough to assure that.  Further, assaults based on disruptive change from the other 
main layers within the existing PC industry were foreseeable and under control.  
Computer manufacturers had been rendered toothless by making their product a 
commodity, though they remained a distant threat.  Novell, while still annoyingly 
independent as a networking company, was in a weak strategic position.  Intel was the 
most worrisome potential source of disruption, but a known and containable one.  
Disruptive change in existing PC applications markets was unlikely to be the source of 
new competition, as the nearly universally distributed applications, “personal 
productivity applications” like word processing and spreadsheets, were dominantly sold 
by Microsoft.
42  The application that brought disruptive change was fundamentally from 
the outside, “born on the Internet” as Mr. Gates wrote. 
b) Vertical Disintegration and Competition 
Based on its knowledge of the history of the PC industry, Microsoft analyzed the 
threat to its position posed by the Internet in a sophisticated way The problem was a piece 
of platform-level software, the browser, outside Microsoft’s strategic control.  Microsoft 
viewed the existence of a second, partially overlapping network effects system – 
                                                 
41 In another interesting document, GX 336, Mr. Gates writes “Netscape’s strategy is to make 
Windows and the Apple Macintosh operating system all but irrelevant . . . hoping that its browser will 
become a de facto platform for software development, ultimately replacing Windows as the mainstream.”  
Why might a complement be able to do that? “the widespread adoption of the Internet is a sea-change.” 
(emphasis added)  Note that he writes that it is not some new technical development, but adoption, that is 
the sea-change.  I agree, which is why I write that it is the commercialization of the Internet that was the 
disruptive change. 
Relatedly, Mr. Gates in his Internet Strategy Day keynote address expects his engineers to easily 
criticize the ‘net “in terms of pure technology.”  But he points out that it has critical mass of users and 
content, so that “any weaknesses or limitations it has almost become strength, because you get thousands of 
companies jumping in to fix those problems, viewing it as a commercial opportunity.”   
42 Office itself was a secure monopoly buttressed by network effects, especially with control of the 
most important other layer from the perspective of an application, the operating system, under Microsoft's 
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Netscape’s Browser and/or Sun’s Java as the core of one system, its own Windows as the 
core of another – as competitive.  Let us now look at their thinking on that.  In a way, this 
is the core of the “general equilibrium” extension they have made to network effects 
theory.   
What was frightening to Microsoft about the independent browser were a series of 
important market and technical features.  First, once it was clear that the Internet was an 
important complement to a large number of PC users, the browser was going to be very 
widely distributed, nearly ubiquitous.  Second, the browser had the possibility to come 
between the operating system and applications, that is, to be “middleware.”  A user could, 
for example, have access to an application running on the web somewhere rather than on 
his own PC.  With some technical progress, the clumsiness of that kind of access that was 
visible in early 1995 might be reduced, and running applications “in the browser” might 
become popular (as might designing ‘net-centric applications like email and IM “for the 
browser.”) 
43 
Those first two features were relevant in the discussion of the browser wars, 
above.  Here the third element of the browser becomes quite relevant.  Navigator was a 
“cross platform” piece of middleware.  It ran, not only on Windows, but also on other 
kinds of “client” computers.  If applications came to be written “for the browser” they 
would run, not only on Windows, but also on Macintoshes and on various cheap UNIX 
variants, or even on whole new kinds of computers.  This prospect was very alarming to 
Microsoft.  The browser might “abstract” Windows, by spanning multiple kinds of PC.  
That would reduce the role of Windows as the center of the indirect network effects, in 
the first instance.  It would permit competition from other operating systems running on 
Intel processors, or from other kinds of hardware – as long as they could run a browser 
and as long as the user could get the applications she wanted “in the browser.”  To make 
matters worse, if the browser itself could not become the applications development 
environment that “abstracted” Windows in this way, the very widely distributed Netscape 
browser might serve as a distribution vehicle for something that did – Java was the 
obvious candidate. 
The core of Microsoft’s worry about the browser as an enabler of competition for 
Windows came from this spanning and abstracting.  
Much can be learned of their thinking from the time, in spring 1995, when 
                                                 
43  Mr. Maritz, alarmed, in GX 490 summarized these two features:  “Netscape:  The first 
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Microsoft grew aware of the potential Browser threat and turned to deal with it.
44  Mr. 
Gates’ Internet Tidal Wave memorandum  stated the nature of the problem in clear terms 
(my emphasis in the figure).    
 
Mr. Gates sees Netscape’s innovation as bad for Microsoft through enabling 
operating system and hardware competition.  His analysis is predicated on vertical 
disintegration:  only the dominant position of the non-Microsoft browser will permit 
external control over “network extensions.”   His concern is that the browser is “multi-
platform” i.e., runs on many operating systems, so that it might “commoditize the 
underlying operating system.”  The consequence is a reduction in entry barriers “Internet 
fans” might “create something far less expensive than a PC which is powerful enough for 
Web browsing.”   
This focus on vertical disintegration drew, once again, on the inductive tradition 
of the theorizing we have seen from Microsoft.  They were so sure that a platform 
technology that spanned and abstracted Windows would increase the competitiveness of 
Windows' environment because they had seen the operating system span and abstract the 
IBM PC.  They knew, from that experience and many others in the PC business, that real 
threats could be encouraged by complements to their product.  They viewed the World 
Wide Web in general and the browser and java in specific as dangerous developments 
precisely because they had platform potential and were outside their strategic control.   
Mr. Gates was basing his analysis upon the work of many Microsoft employees in 
the Internet area.  Ben Slivka (1995) wrote an influential memo with “a lot of material” in 
the same time period entitled “The Web is the Next Platform.” Here is the beginning and 
a bit from Ch.1: 
 
 
                                                 
44  Some Microsoft employees had, of course, been aware of Internet technologies before this time, 
as the Internet had been in use, primarily in noncommercial contexts, for over two decades.  It was, 
however, the commercialization of the Internet at the hands of entrepreneurs like the founders of Netscape 




There are several key messages in Mr. Slivka’s memo.  Note that he underlines 
Mr. Gates’ analysis of the mechanisms by which competition from the WWW might be 
problematic.  He has a “nightmare scenario” related to the possibility of “operating 
system-neutral” developments – spanning and abstracting leading to loss of product 
differentiation and of entry barriers.
45  Mr. Slivka is concerned that, since “no one 
controls and everyone can enhance” the Web, an era of Microsoft control of standards 
setting could come to an end.   
It was not only the possibility of competition from a newer, cheaper, home 
computing device that had Microsoft officials concerned.  In a planning memo titled 
“Preserving the Desktop Paradise,”
46 Brad Chase (1997) (GX 512) agreed with others 
that the strategic goal of Netscape was to “obsolete Windows” and to “commoditize the 
OS.”  At this somewhat later date, however, Chase is concerned about customers at work 
as much as home, for he is concerned that the developments in Java and the browser are 
“precisely those that make the NC viable.”  We saw above that successful entry by the 
NC was partially blocked by lack of features, partly by lack of applications. Entry and 
success of the NC are, as Chase makes clear, contingent on the success of some kind of 
cross-platform middleware such as the Browser or Java, which would permit 
development of applications that could be more easily ported from Windows to NC.   
Note also that, even at this late date, Mr. Chase refers back to the disruptive nature of the 
commercialization of the Internet to open his analysis: 
                                                 
45 The nightmare is only a nightmare for Microsoft, however, as customers – he is obviously 
thinking about customers using their computer at home -- gain tremendously from new competition ushered 
in by operating system neutrality, getting the computer they want for one quarter of the current price.   
46 Oddly titled if the industry were perfectly competitive, don’t you think? Page 25  Bresnahan  Preliminary Version 
 
Figure 18 
Many, many more Microsoft employees saw the potential for the positive 
feedback surrounding the Internet, if there were an independent browser, to move in a 
direction to “abstract” Windows and therefore “obsolete” its standard-setting role.  
Here is Mr. Rashid, head of research, in April 1995 on how the browser might 
rapidly move in that direction.
47  GX 521 
 
Mr. Maritz: "if more and more application programs get their services from Navigator 
and not from Windows, the perceived value of Windows is going to decline, and the 
ability to have those applications moved to other platforms will also be increased." 
Mr. Slivka, in “The Web is the Next Platform,” (cited above) GX 39, is unwilling 
to have any vertical disintegration within the various platform layers as they lead to 
opportunities for competition. It is quite clear that the WWW is a threat to Microsoft’s 
ability to unilateral ability to set standards, which Mr. Slivka sees as a source of 
profitability, and that part of the problem is that the Web is open.  Note that he believes 
that Microsoft must become “the supplier of choice for Internet technology.”  Failing 
that, the key to the profitability of the company will be lost, for they will risk losing the 
standard setting role they have in operating systems and in Office: 
 
Figure 19 
The importance of vertical disintegration for entry and long run competition is 
illustrated by other kinds of internal Microsoft analyses as well, such as those related to 
pricing Windows.  Joachim Kempin (1997) asks, in a heading about a Windows pricing 
                                                 
47  Many, many . Mr. Wright GX 407 “core threat for Microsoft is the potential for this platform to 
abstract the Win32 API.”  Mr. Slivka again GX 399 4/95 “slightly extreme view of the ability of the Web 
to make Windows irrelevant, but it [is sic] worthwhile to ponder this possible future”   Page 26  Bresnahan  Preliminary Version 
plan “Who can derail this plan and MSFT counter tactics.”  Among the “who” are no 
current vendors of other operating systems for PCs or other horizontal substitutes – no 
mention of the Macintosh, of Be, or of Linux.  Sun (only) is mentioned under the “OS 
competitor” heading, but as one that would have to enter by way of Java, so that “for the 
next 2-3 years the barriers are huge for them.”   
The threats Kempin considers, but discards as not actually constraining Microsoft, 
are all threats of potential entry in to the OS business sponsored by or undertaken by 
firms in other layers.  One is from an “OEM coalition” – current complementors / 
customers who might “fund a competing effort (say in India).”  Other potential sponsors 
include an ISV, Netscape, and Intel, the microprocessor manufacturer, or a Netscape-
Intel-Compaq coalition.   Kempin thinks that all of these are unlikely threats, however, 
because they would have to get over the great “inertia” created by customer investments 
in “training, infrastructure and applications in windows [sic] computing.”  But they are 
the closest threats he can adduce to the Windows monopoly.  Kempin’s pricing analysis 
assumes (with some foundation, as anyone who has met firms in the other layers will 
attest) that firms in the layers around Microsoft are adequately annoyed with the way 
Microsoft has been handling the Windows monopoly that they might sponsor a potential 
entrant or become potential entrants themselves.  Vertical disintegration is critical to 
Kempin’s argument that there is a --  small -- threat of entry from the existing 
complementors; his assessment of the small size of the threat turns on the inertia 
associated with lock in to Windows network effects. 
Mr. Maritz, Group Vice President, Platforms, and third in command at Microsoft, 
spoke in court to the issue of how a complement in the present could become, with 
suitable developments, a substitute in the future.
48: Even though middleware, of which 
the Netscape browser is an example “is not, in itself, an operating system.  It relies on a 
[sic] underlying operating system, but it takes on many of the functions of an operating 
system.”  Despite this distinction between Browser/middleware and operating system, 
"Netscape was becoming a platform ... that other software could depend upon, and they 
were extending its capability as a platform.  And one of the natures of a software 
platform is that it exists to enable other software and if the other software is depending 
upon your competitor's platform, even if it's running on top of your own platform, over 
time the value of the platform can become diminished ... ."  Note the very explicit 
pointing to the competition from the next layer over.  “Even if it [the browser] is running 
on top of your own platform, over time the value of the platform [Windows] can become 
diminished.”  
Mr. Slivka talked about the same kinds of issues in his deposition.
49 "So the point 
is not that the little tiny Web browser, you know, whether it was Navigator  or Navigator 
2 or Navigator 3, the point was not that that thing as it stood then would immediately kill 
Windows.  . . . The point was that that thing could grow and blossom and provide an 
application development platform which was more popular than Windows." 
Chris Jones farther down in IPM (523) no “full frontal assault” we have already 
seen. But the opportunity to have Windows be abstracted by a web-oriented applications 
development platform is problematic.  And that is the bottom line for Microsoft; external 
control of platform-capable software is highly troubling to them. 
                                                 
48  Maritz testimony, 1/25/99pm.  
49  Slivka Deposition., 1/13/99.. Page 27  Bresnahan  Preliminary Version 
i) Java 
While we have not spent a great deal of time on Java, it is worth noticing that 
Microsoft employees used the same framework, especially emphasizing vertical 
disintegration as a mechanism for breaking lock in and thus permitting entry.  Here is Mr. 
Maritz on the future of the Java threat in Maritz GX 490 (97 platform plan) Note that 
here he sees that the potential entrant into the operating systems business that is enabled 
by Sun’s Java is Sun’s OS.  This is one of the two main forms of argument about why 
vertical disintegration permits entry.  In the other main form, which we saw above, entry 
is itself vertically disintegrated, so the entrant OS and spanning layer might be from 
different firms.  
 
Figure 20 
Here is Mr. Maritz in GX 42 on why to avoid a vertically disintegrated Java.  
Figure 21  
Mr. Muglia, August 1996 “’97 Tools Vision” memo to Developer Tools Division 
wrote that when the focus of applications development moves away from Microsoft’s 
APIs to others, this contributes to the momentum of the outside platform, possibly 
leading to new competition by “potentially opening up the opportunity for our competitor 




As you can see, Mr. Muglia does not want to leave “a hole in our strategy” because he 
thinks that this permits entry into Microsoft’s existing businesses.  Let us now turn to the 
breadth of that remark.  
ii)  Total Control of All Platform Layers 
Brad Chase FY98 Planning Memo “Preserving the Desktop Paradise” 4/97 
(GX512) any vertical disintegration at platform level is bad for Microsoft.  His emphasis 
(in Figure 23) refers to the tendency of customers, come circumstances, to use some 
technologies other than Microsoft’s instead of becoming all-Microsoft shops.  
 
Figure 23 
This is, in fact, a theory, applied with suitable alterations in a large number of 
distinct factual situations.  It is not just the disruptive and surprising “Trojan horse” 
examples of browser and Java that Microsoft wants to bring under its own control, but in 
general vertical disintegration of the platform space is to be avoided.  We have already 
seen the discussion of Novell Netware in the same framework.  Mr. Slivka was very clear 
about the issue in “The Web is the Next Platform” (GX 1016) writing Microsoft must “be Page 29  Bresnahan  Preliminary Version 
the product supplier of choice for all key existing Web technologies – clients, servers, 
and publishing tools, at a minimum.”   
c) Converters? Spanning!  The Decision to be Cross-Platform 
Microsoft’s thinking about partially overlapping clusters of network effects is an 
important nexus for investigating compatibility decisions.
50  There are two important 
strategic ideas here, a defensive one, reviewed in this subsection, about how to deal with 
an externally controlled technology which threatens to span and abstract Windows, and 
an offensive one, which appears in the next subsection.   
Both the defensive strategic idea and the attacking strategic idea build on a simple 
point about the behavior of the nonstrategic, follower actors, such as users and 
developers.  The nonstrategic actors are going to be fundamentally ambivalent about a 
platform; on one side, they value continuity because they have sunk costs specific to the 
platform.  So they tend to stay with the familiar, and like familiar platforms to evolve 
predictably and sedately.  On the other side, the nonstrategic actors often feel the chafing 
of being locked-in, and would like to be liberated from it.  They would especially like to 
be liberated from it in a compatible way, that is, a way that does not break with their 
existing sunk costs.  This is a very simple point, highly familiar from either industry 
history or the theory. 
When we put this basic point in the general equilibrium context of two partially 
overlapping indirect network effects clusters, we get a much richer structure that leads to 
two interesting Microsoft strategic doctrines.  On the defensive side, a problem Microsoft 
had to deal with was that nonstrategic actors liked the cross-platform nature of Navigator 
and Java.  This was viewed, in the user and developer's eyes, as a positive feature of 
those technologies.  And why not?  A cross-platform browser is better than a 
monoplatform one; one can look at web pages and run web applications (such as they 
were) without constraint of checking the underlying OS
51.  "Write once, run everywhere" 
is obviously a positive feature of Java for a developer.  Cross-platform is a plus because it 
is the removal of a constraint. Hence Microsoft's defensive doctrine.  When worried 
about being spanned and abstracted by a cross platform complement, take away the 
advantage by making your own version and making it be cross-platform.  The lovely 
phrase "enough x-platform to be competitive" in GX 52 (Figure 24), captures this 
perfectly.  Thus Microsoft set out to have its browser and it's Java virtual machine run on 
other kinds of computers, like Macs and UNIX boxes.  Indeed, in one of the more 
memorable moments of the browser war, they compelled Apple to heavily favor IE over 
Navigator.
52  The point is to take away a selling point -- cross platform capability. 
Not surprisingly, this kind of strategy puts a certain amount of stress on a firm 
that thinks of itself as in the platform-management business.  It takes careful management 
to make sure that ones own offering is truly cross-platform, for Microsoft engineers and 
                                                 
50 The theory has spent a good deal of time on decisions about compatibility in competitive 
situations, and on the role of “converter” technologies – those which permit a user or developers who have 
made sunk investments specific to a platform to take advantage of those investments while using another 
platform 
51   See, among many, many such references, the discussion in GX 233.  Some of the discussion is 
quite subtle.  See, e.g., GX 503, where ISPs want a cross-platform browser (because their customers do). 
52  A slightly odd behavior if IE was an operating system improvement, don’t you think? Page 30  Bresnahan  Preliminary Version 
managers will have both the knowledge and strategic predilection for "Windows first."  
Partly this stress is reduced by simply managing it, partly by organization to keep people 
with very different goals (platform building and cross-platform spanning) from sitting 
next to one another, and partly by promising oneself that the cross-platform phase is 
temporary -- it will only last as long as competitively necessary (more on this in a 
moment.)   
Here’s one from GX 52 about the early part 
 
Figure 24 
Once a technology has been offered for a while in a cross platform way, the 
strategic reasons for that will become less important, notably after the externally 
controlled technology has lost any real momentum to span and abstract Windows.  At 
that juncture, plenty of voices will be raised to remove or make far less important the 
cross-platform feature.  Mr. Allchin, in GX 475, offered a strongly worded version of this 
“it’s time to go back to Windows” argument.  
d) Converters? Spanning!  Embrace and Extend 
Now, let us turn to the offensive doctrine, called "embrace and extend."  If there is 
a nascent indirect network effect building around an externally controlled technology, 
Microsoft will wish to ensure that it ultimately controls it.  "Embrace and extend" means 
make your own version which is fully as functional as the outside technology, and in 
some ways ("extensions") even a little bit better (sometimes the “better” is only on 
Windows.)
53.  Then there is no reason for the nonstrategic actors to use the outside 
version, and perhaps even a bit of a reason to use the Microsoft variant.  Again, the 
strategy takes advantage of the ambivalence on the nonstrategic actors' part.   
Now, "embrace and extend" doesn't work very well against a canny, inventive 
external actor (like Netscape.)  They will keep adding their own extensions, making the 
embrace difficult.  But it works quite well against consortia, universities, and the like, and 
tolerably well against outside agents who, for some reason, are "open" with their standard 
setting. 
Mr. Gates Internet strategy day keynote speech suggests that either they or 
Netscape will embrace and extend open Internet standards. 
                                                 
53 More generally, this strategy could almost fully embrace rather than fully – if nonstrategic 
actors are making tradeoffs, the Microsoft version could be somewhat less functional than the outside 
technology and the strategy still works. Page 31  Bresnahan  Preliminary Version 
 
Figure 25 
Mr. Gates, in DX 400, put this in a very interesting way.  He wanted to “make 
Microsoft products the cornerstone of [anyone’s] internet access strategy.”  He views the 
problem as one in which the “key here is to find places where Microsoft can set de facto 
standards without competing with the existing standards bodies.”   He was writing, in 
April 1994, at a time when he thought the Internet was run by “standards bodies” like the 
IETF, a bit simpler to deal with than Netscape.  




He was hardly alone in this call.
54  Mr. Maritz, in GX 490, made same point about the 
browser.  “Embrace and extend” meant “Implement all Netscape Features” and “Offer 
new Differentiated features.” – interestingly, on both Windows and Mac (cross-platform 
embrace and extend!)  When communicating this message to programmers, Mr. Chase (in 
the GX 684 document we saw above) emphasized the need to “clone all the features they 
have today, plus new ones they will add between now and our next release.”  “We have 
to get serious about extending and owning HTML as a format, and in the process 
leverage our existing assets to get ahead.”  Mr. Maritz wrote (in GX 503) that the 
strategic point was to “Get control of, then leverage the programming model” used by 
developers.  
e) Equilibrium problems 
Once one has embraced and extended, then there is every opportunity to guide the 
developer body toward Windows-specific variants.  Why not make it easier for them to 
do what you want, which is develop for Windows?  xxxx called this "embrace, extend, 
and then turn the crank."
55  Interestingly, the defensive strategy ends the same way.  Once 
the outside threat is blunted (and the temporary period of cross-platform supply is often 
an important part of that) and one has the undivided attention of developers and users, 
                                                 
54   Cf. GX 148, from May ’95, which summarizes the Internet strategy in this way.  
55  Outsiders call this strategy “embrace, extend, extinguish.”   Page 32  Bresnahan  Preliminary Version 
why, it is time to steer them back to Windows.  One can even continue to offer "cross 
platform" versions, as a courtesy to old customers.  The technology simply works better, 
and is released earlier, for Windows.
56 
This raises two very interesting analytical points: rational expectations and 
determinacy.  Since the endgame is, in both strategies, not one in which developers and 
users get the combination of liberation and continuity that the intermediate stages seem to 
promise, why do these strategies work in RE equilibrium?  Don’t they know that supply 
is only going to be open and cross platform as long as it feels compelled to be?  It appears 
that the strategies that I have described have an element of equilibrium opportunism in 
them.  How can that be right?  Second, in a partially overlapping set of two or more 
indirect network effect systems, what permits one firm to embrace and extend, and the 
other not to be embraced and extended?   
The RE question cannot be satisfactorily answered without attributing to the 
nonstrategic users and developers some fundamental limitation.  My natural modeling 
tendency would be to say that these agents are smart and foresighted, but that there is an 
externality.  All the followers would have to act together to defeat the strategy, and that 
would be prohibitively expensive to coordinate -- indeed, the plausible mechanism to 
coordinate such a thing is to have a non-follower (strategic) agent build a set of 
technologies that lead the positive feedback that coordinates the collective action.   Here 
is a very interesting (Gates / Myhrvold) discussion of the subject in 1994 (Hors de 
combat, they thought at the time..  The meditative flavor here comes because they 




The essence of the argument here is that developers are not only hard to coordinate 
because they are separate; they are to some degree in competition with one another.  Thus 
they will follow their own individual best responses.  Further, time matters to developers 
– they need to gain “any advantage” in developing now. Mr. Myrhvold thinks that only a 
“large player who can create something significantly new and evangelize it successfully” 
can lead to a new standard.
57  Efforts of the smaller players to have technologies develop 
the way they like “for the most part . . .will fail.” 
As in any large social system, there are certain limits on the ability of platform 
leaders to exploit followers, and thus limit to the model of Microsoft as leader, users and 
                                                 
56   Mr. Gates wrote, after Microsoft had been undertaking cross-platform development for a 
while, that it was time to remind developers that cross platform development has disadvantages as well as 
advantages and to lead them back toe Windows.  
57  It would be interesting to learn if he still believes now that the large player must be commercial, 
after the open source movement demonstrated some positive features.  In any case, his view of the 
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developers as atomistic, nonstrategic followers.  In some circumstances, outsiders act 
outside their own individual self-interest, coordinating on strategies that matter for the 
leaders.  For example, a Microsoft team was sent off to find out about Netscape’s revenue 
sources, with the goal of knowing enough to put the firm out of business.
58 They reported 
back “Sorry this took quite some time . . . . Customers/ISPs don’t want to talk about it 
because they all know we are out to get them [Netscape].”  Relatedly, there is a strong 
tendency among many developers to prefer open standards even when their self-interest 
is as described in Figure 27.  Computer people use the label “religion” to describe this 
behavior.   
Now the question of who embraces and extends whom is an even  more 
interesting one.  In a competitive race, it has no -- can have no -- set answer.  But in the 
game of old, established Windows against upstart Navigator, the core of the answer 
would be fleetness against "gravity" (in Mr. Gates useful phrase, above.)  That is my last 
positive topic, to which we now turn.   
f)  Extension of the n/w effects 
As it worked out, Microsoft’s efforts to embrace and extend the protocols by 
which the Internet connects to PCs was successful in the marketplace, and the possibility 
that Internet technologies would span and abstract Windows was blunted.  We didn’t get 
(a) competition in OS (b) a serious effort to replace Windows in the OS or even (c) 
separate control of browser network effects so that there might be, later on, efforts at (a) 
or (b).  Instead, we got control of both browser and operating system network effects by 
the same firm.  Why did it go that way and not the other way?  The essence of 
Microsoft’s strategy in dealing with the challenges brought to it by the commercialization 
of the Internet was twofold.  First, slow down the momentum that might have led to 
external control of Browser standards and/or divided applications standards by thwarting 
the widespread distribution, use, and development of technologies such as Navigator and 
Java.
59  With that momentum thwarted, Microsoft had enough time to build its own 
offerings for the Internet.   
The second part of Microsoft’s strategy had a simple part and a complex part.   
The simple part is related to the theory in a fairly direct way, and I will simply state it 
rather than investigate it carefully.  Microsoft bought a browser, improved it over time, 
gave it away to consumers, and bullied or bribed an enormous number of industry 
participants (computer manufacturers, Internet service providers, etc., etc.) to push it even 
if their customers would have rather had Navigator, and ultimately worked very hard to 
make it a “jolting experience” for end users to use anything else.
60  The obvious point 
here is that if one is behind and wants to be tipped-to, one needs to have an offering, as 
well as to slow down the momentum and avoid being tipped-from.  The end-user side of 
that called for all those marketing and strategic moves to, in the early stages, keep IE 
usage at a high enough market share so that the market would not tip to Navigator, and, 
in the later stages, to drive up IE usage so as to accelerate the tip to it.  
                                                 
58 To “cut off their air supply” in Paul Maritz’ colorful phrase.  
59  Many of the mechanisms by which it accomplished that slowing down of competitors are, and 
should be, highly illegal.  This paper has spent little time on that issue, but it is an important one in the 
broader context.  See Salop (1999), Bresnahan (2001), and sources cited therein.   
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The less obvious part of Microsoft’s strategy involved the developer side.  As we 
have seen, standard Microsoft doctrine of platform strategy calls for influencing both 
sides, users and developers, of the indirect network effects.   Microsoft set out to get 
developers to use its Internet technologies by “migrating” them slowly from Windows 
technologies to Windows+Internet technologies.  The network effects in Windows were 
extended to include (Microsoft) Internet technologies.  How this works out tells us 
something more about Microsoft’s view of the appropriate theory of the industry when 
there is the possibility of two separate platform layers that might span and abstract one 
another.  Microsoft seeks to avoid that outcome because of its competitive ramifications.  
The same outcomes tell us something else about Microsoft’s views on the pace of 
technical change in computing.  They strongly favor incrementalism over distruptive 
change.  Part of the reason is that in a system of incremental change only, the advantage 
goes to the incumbent, which resolves the indeterminacy I flagged in the last section. 
Mr. Gates, in 1996, (GX 336) thought “an important benefit of Microsoft’s 
strategy is that it preserves the tremendous investments that people and companies have 
made in computer hardware, software, and training.”  He points to “more than 150 
Million users of Windows, 5 million people developing windows software . . . more than 
1,000 companies supply[ing] component software.”
61   




As did Chris Jones in the Internet Planning Memo (GX 523) – he talks about 
“keeping” and “leveraging” rather than building new momentum: 
 
Figure 29 
We have already seen GX 684 with its contrast of Netscape “messages” to various 
market constituencies and recommendations of how MSFT should respond.  Here is a key 
page about marketing to Independent Software Developers: 
                                                 
61  Many thought this.  Mr. Muglia August ’96 “’97 Tools Vision” “our Internet strategy brings 
with it the adoption of a key integration technology.  That technology is of course COM and we can built 
upon it as the basis for our overall tools vision.” Page 35  Bresnahan  Preliminary Version 
 
Figure 30 
Notice how strongly continuity and the developer’s past investments and sunk 
costs (Microsoft side) are contrasted to change (Netscape side.)  Microsoft’s advantages 
are headlined as inertial – “Leverage” of existing investment, existing “Developtment 
Tools” “will help you move”  this is a “Migration” not a revolution.  The same themes – 
contrast continuity (Microsoft) vs. radical change (Netscape) are reiterated in the 
“corporations” (meaning developers of in-house applications) slide.  Rather than 
“changing the way” you do things, the Internet “is only a part of what you do today.”  
Microsoft’s solution “Works best with your existing products” – Office, Mail systems, 
Development tools.  
Mr. Slivka, in “The Web is the Next Platform”, GX 21 offers a theory of this 
(once again that inductive method!) drawing on experience in the operating system and 
local area network (Netware again!) markets 
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The striking thing about this theory is the degree to which it thinks that disruptive 
technical change is a bad idea.  Mr. Slivka believes, and Microsoft set out to accomplish, 
a smooth and continuous migration to Windows+Internet.  At no stage should a 
developer or a customer ever make an incompatible move, all change should come by 
way of compatible improvements.  This doctrine is the key to a longstanding mystery 
about Microsoft, how can a firm so full of technically gifted people do so little raw 
innovation
62.  The answer appears to lie in Microsoft’s view of the wisdom of disruptive 
technical change, not in their capabilities to undertake it.   
The strategy for implementing this is summarized in this very simple and abstract 
statement in the marketing review document we looked at back in Figure 1 (Gx 488)  
 
Figure 32 
After slowing down the hare with “gravity,” the tortoise may, at his leisure, 
migrate the existing cluster of network effects into a new technological area.   
5) Relationship to Antitrust Case 
One of the standing concerns of the network effects literature has been the 
possibility of “lock in” to inefficient allocations.
63  The idea which commenters on 
Microsoft, the antitrust case, have drawn from the literature is that the case, which is 
clearly related to the economics of networks, must have at its core an assertion somehow 
related to lock in.  The market “must” be locked in to an inefficient Windows monopoly, 
for example, where it might have chosen another, superior technology.
64  In the context 
of Microsoft, this would mean that the motivation for policy intervention is that the 
economy is locked in to a bad standard – Windows – and that the point of the antitrust 
case would be to liberate the economy from that lock in.  A number of engineers and 
                                                 
62  A standing mystery in the engineering literature, which frequently poses the question as “why 
can’t Microsoft innovate?”  Microsoft is a very effective incremental improver and commercializer of 
software, and those are very important economic tasks in this industry.  The engineers are asking more 
about initiating new and innovative ideas, and they point out that Microsoft has been more of a follower 
and less of a leader in that domain.  It appears incorrect to think of this as Microsoft “can’t” do this.  It’s a 
management doctrine; they think disruptive technical change is a bad idea  (Whether only for their position 
or for the industry in general remains to be seen.)  
63  A related set of dynamical welfare economic topics has been addressed in the literature as well.   
These include the possibility of excess inertia, a concept closely related to lock in, and its opposite, excess 
momentum toward change.   
64 Or, in a slightly more dynamical version of the same story, the market “must” have excess 
inertia as a result of the network effects that keep the equilibrium standard lodged in Windows.  Thus, for 
example, it “must” be true that the market “should” have switched to the Network Computer, or OS/2, etc. Page 37  Bresnahan  Preliminary Version 
economists have joined the debate about the antitrust case from that perspective – on both 
sides.
65   
  This is absolutely not the economic story behind Microsoft, nor could it be under 
American antitrust law.  That law draws a fundamental distinction between monopoly, 
which is legal, and monopolization, which is not.   In the law, monopoly means 
approximately what it means in economics – substantial market power resulting from 
something that permits exclusion of competitors.
66  “Monopolization” means more – it 
means (a) possessing monopoly power and (b) obtaining or maintaining monopoly power 
by means other than competing on the merits.  Typically, the logical test for “other than 
competing on the merits” is actions that are profitable only through removing or 
softening competitors, not through their direct impact on demand.  These are called (more 
or less synonymously) “predatory” or “exclusionary” or “anticompetitive” acts.
67   
The deep economic reason why monopoly, alone, should legal is that there are 
many efficient monopolies.  A firm may be able to exclude rivals by having a better 
product, or by investing early in a first-mover-advantage context, or by other means.  
Note, however, that this welfare economics argument about outcomes is not where 
antitrust law draws the distinction.  “Monopolization” isn’t “having an inefficient 
monopoly.”  The boundary, instead, is a process one.  Monopolies become illegal 
monopolization when obtained or maintained by a process involving anticompetitive 
acts.
68  
As a result of this fundamental tenet of antitrust law, the government did not – 
could not – challenge the legitimacy of the Windows monopoly.  The core “monopoly 
                                                 
65  Engineers write from this perspective reliably.  But they are not the only ones.  See, e.g., 
Bittlingmayer (1999) who writes “. . . We might get stuck, in theory, with an expensive, inferior operating 
system that is immune to competitive forces.  Some economists have indeed proposed an important role for 
lock-in generating ‘market failure,’ and in particular market failure that is remediable through the 
instrument of antitrust.”   The market share leaders in this particular error must be Liebowitz and Margolis, 
however, for they have undertaken an enormous program of research examining the question of whether 
software markets (including, more recently operating systems) are locked into “bad” outcomes.  Passing for 
today on the quality of their evidence on this point, it is simply irrelevant to the case. 
Another very common form of argument is to make the error in quotes.  For example, Muris 
(1999) is perfectly correct to answer his title question, “Is Heightened Antitrust Scrutiny Appropriate for 
Software Markets?” because of network effects with a “No,” (network effects play the role of an entry 
barrier and a reason to deny distribution to an entrant, familiar unheightened antitrust scrutiny elements.)  
Yet he attributes to an enormous number of authors the view that the Microsoft case should be brought to 
end inefficient lock in, including Paul Krugman and Brian Arthur.   
Not all observers make this error. While they had criticized the “use and abuse” of this new theory 
in an earlier paper, Lopatka and Page (1999) for example, while defending Microsoft’s practices as 
efficient, correctly note that “network effects  . . .create entry barriers in the market for operating systems” 
which is the main role they play in the case.   
66  See, e.g., Areeda and Hovenkamp (1996) for a definition.  It needn’t mean “no substitutes” at 
all, of course. 
67 Areeda and Hovenkamp (1996) define monopolization analytically as the union of monopoly 
power plus "'behavior that not only (1) tends to impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does 
not further competition on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way'".   
68 While there is a relationship between this process definition and economic outcomes (see 
Ordover and Willig and Saloner and Ordover for efforts to make the relationship close) they are not the 
same.  The courts have adopted the process definition rather than an outcomes one in order to have a law 
that can be meaningfully enforced, rather than because of any conviction that the process definition is better 
in substance. Page 38  Bresnahan  Preliminary Version 
maintenance” legal theory was that Microsoft had a legitimate monopoly in operating 
systems circa 1995, but that the commercialization of the Internet unleashed competitive 
forces that might have ended or substantially reduced the importance of that monopoly by 
about now (late 2000) if Microsoft had not blocked the competitive process.  Thus the 
core of the monopolization claim is that Microsoft, an established (legal) monopolist, saw 
the commercialization of the Internet as highly likely to increase competition in its core 
markets.  (We saw some parts of this assessment in Section 4)b), above.)  Microsoft was 
unable to block the wide distribution of innovative Internet technologies outside its own 
control by competing against them.  (We saw much of Microsoft’s assessment of that in 
section 2), above.)  Microsoft did block that widespread distribution by exclusionary acts 
(which we have not spent much time on in this paper.)  “Established monopolist fears 
competition resulting from new technologies, thwarts distribution of the technologies by 
anticompetitive means” – antitrust law does not need any new economic theory to figure 
that one out.  
The network effects theory does have a relationship to Microsoft, but it is not that 
obvious one.  (So much of industry equilibrium is determined by the same objects as the 
theory that there must be some relationship.) The first part of the relationship is the 
closest to received theory, and the least important.  Network effects in the operating 
systems market provide a barrier to entry.  The Windows monopoly is highly valuable, 
and Microsoft was willing to pay to preserve it.  (See discussion of the positive issues 
related to this in section 3), above.)  This relationship is not very important because 
theory played a small role in showing that there are in fact entry barriers into the 
operating system monopoly, and no theory whatsoever was needed to show that 
Microsoft wanted to preserve the Windows monopoly.  Nonetheless, it is true that the 
underlying theory of entry barriers defending the Microsoft monopoly in Microsoft was 
an indirect network effects theory, relabeled as the “applications barrier to entry.”  What 
is important in the case is not that we might have permanently locked into Windows, a 
bad standard, but rather that, when things changed and Windows might have been 
augmented or replaced by forces outside Microsoft, that Microsoft was in a position to 
block that new competition.
69   
The second relationship is slightly more important to the case.  Microsoft saw two 
main threats to its monopoly as a result of the commercialization of the Internet, cross-
platform Java (cross-platform: runs on PC or Mac or Linux or etc.) and Netscape’s 
browser.  Microsoft sought to prevent widespread distribution of these innovative 
technologies.  Network effects in the browser market were part of Microsoft’s thinking.  
They sought to slow down the process of convergence to a Netscape Navigator standard 
or to an open standard outside Microsoft’s control.  Related network effects for 
applications divided between your PC and servers on the Internet were part of 
Microsoft’s thinking on why to slow down the process of convergence to a cross-
platform Java standard.  (See discussion of the positive issues related to browser 
standards in section 2), above.)   But the specifics of Microsoft’s thinking played little 
                                                 
69  Relatedly, entry barriers into browsers are buttressed by network effects, so that Microsoft’s 
current browser monopoly is unlikely to be reversed by entry – an entrant will find itself in the position of 
the Microsoft employees quoted in section 2)c) – unable to win by having a better product against an 
entrenched incumbent – and no entrant will have a monopoly operating system to tie its browser to. Page 39  Bresnahan  Preliminary Version 
role in the lawsuit; their conclusion that these new technologies were a threat and the 
anticompetitive character of their blunting of that threat were what mattered legally.   
Which leads me to the third role that network effects and lock in – but not 
received theory – played in the case.  That was the possibility that disruptive change in a 
complement might be the force that ends lock in to a standard.  (see sections 4)a), 4)b), 
above)  The commercialization of the Internet looked to market participants, including 
Microsoft, as a big enough piece of disruptive change to possibly end or heavily modify 
the existing structure of positive feedback.  That was prevented by Microsoft’s 
anticompetitive acts.  Here both practice (Microsoft didn’t wait for an academic theory to 
tell it to block those developments) and policy (the law condemns such blocking though 
the theory hasn’t gotten there yet) have outrun theory.  Exactly that thing which the 
theory had not yet reached is the most important part of the case.  It is a huge irony that 
many observers think that the case was speculative because it was “based in” the theory.   
6) Conclusion 
What I have tried to do in this paper is bring forward those remarks by the 
business people – mostly candid remarks with a strategic or managerial purpose – that 
illuminate the theory.  This has done two interesting things, and another thing, perhaps 
worth remembering, that is of less immediate import to the development of the theory.  
The first interesting thing is that an extraordinary number of the issues raised in the parts 
of modern economic theory that bear on an attempt to collaboratively tip a marketplace 
play a substantial role in the businesspeople’s thinking and acting.  I refer here not only 
to the positive feedback and lock in economics, but also to the economics of imperfect 
information in bargaining, to theories of leadership as selection of equilibria, and to the 
impact of asymmetric information in a coordination game (or bargaining game.)  Wow!   
Second, in several ways, and here I do emphasize narrowly the positive feedback 
and lock in stories, practice is richer and more thoughtful than theory.  In particular, 
practice has had to deal with the general equilibrium problem of multiple, partially 
overlapping clusters of positive feedback.  This leads to some important ideas, at least in 
practice, having to do with why vertical disintegration (of the platform space) is more 
competitive in network industries and to very complex doctrines of technology strategy.   
The third lesson, and one that we should try to remember all the time, is that all 
the objects we put into neat boxes for purposes of analytical clarity in theory won’t go 
there in the world.   
Finally, let me say that while I admire the craft and analytical thinking one finds 
in the Microsoft documents, and find their ideas highly useful in informing my positive 
thinking about network effects and lock in theory, no one should confuse that with 
normative admiration for what they accomplished.  All that brilliance was spent to slow 
down the rate of technical change resulting from the commercialization of the Internet so 
as to give Microsoft, imitator not inventor, enough time to ponderously take proprietary 
control of it.  Page 40  Bresnahan  Preliminary Version 
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